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Defendants/Appellants Laurie Bott, Evan Bott and Jesse Bott (hereinafter referred to
collectively as "the Botts"), by and through counsel, hereby object to Plaintiff/Appellee Regal
Insurance Company's ("Regal") Statement of Facts and Submit their Reply Brief as set forth below.

OBJECTION TO REGAL'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Paragraph 4 of Regal's Statement of Facts states in part that "Jesse Bott died instantly from
the injuries he received in [the] accident." The fact that was stipulated to states that "Jesse Bott died
at the scene from the injuries he received in [the] accident." [R. p. 57 If 4].

ARGUMENT
I.

UTAHf S NO-FAULT STATUTES ARE INTENDED TO COMPENSATE INSUREDS
FOR ACTUAL LOSSES, WHETHER THEY RESULT FROM INJURY,
DISABILITY OR DEATH
The Bott's entitlement to PIP benefits should be resolved in accordance with the Legislature's

intention in passing the PEP statutes. The plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307(l)(a)
through (d) indicates that the Legislature intended automobile insurance companies to provide
insureds with four categories of PIP benefits. This Court has recognized that "PIP benefits are
intended to provide immediate compensation for out-of-pocket expenses and actual loss of earnings
incurred as a result of an accident without having to bring a lawsuit." Versluis v. Guaranty Natl
Cos., 842 P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992); (citing Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 559 P.2d 958,
959 (Utah 1977)). Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(5) requires PIP benefits to be paid monthly so
those injured in auto accidents can continue to meet basic living expenses. Id_ The need for
immediate compensation of out-of-pocket expenses and lost earnings to help insureds meet basic
living expenses is even greater in the event of a death than in the event of most injuries. In order to
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achieve the purpose of Utah's no-fault laws, insurers must be required to pay PIP benefits for lost
wages and household services in the event of a death the same as they would pay in the event of an
injury. To do otherwise would thwart the recognized need for immediate compensation for a
family's expenses and lost earnings that are needed by the deceased's family to meet basic living
expenses.
Courts have properly denied the recovery of PIP benefits when no actual losses have been
sustained or when the same or similar benefits have been paid by a tortfeasor or as worker's
compensation benefits. See Verslius 842 P.2d at 867; Jamison, 559 P.2d 958,959 (Utah 1977); and
Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922 (Utah 1995). The plaintiff in Verslius was denied PIP benefits because
she was not working at the time she was injured and the evidence did not even indicate a reasonable
probability that she would have begun to work after the accident. Verslius, 842 P.2d at 867. In the
instant case, unlike in Verslius, actual losses were sustained. At the time Jesse died, he was gainfully
employed and earning more than the $ 250 per week maximum recoverable benefit for lost wages
or decreased earning capacity. [R. p. 58, f 14; p. 64, f 14; and p. 72, f 14]. Furthermore, at the time
of this loss Jesse resided with his parents where they assert that he assisted with household tasks as
a member of that household. Id. Because PEP benefits are intended to compensate insureds for their
out-of-pocket expenses and actual lost income, the lost earnings and value of household services
resulting from Jesse Bott's death should be awarded in this case.
Regal admits that PIP benefits for lost wages and household services are supposed to be paid
monthly "so that claimants can continue to meet basic living expenses." Regal Brief at p. 10
(quoting Verslius, 842 P.2d at 867 and Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-309(5)). For that reason alone,
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this Court should recognize and hold that the PEP benefits at issue in this case are recoverable by the
estates of those who are killed Just as they are recoverable by those who are injured in motor vehicle
accidents. The family of an individual killed in an auto accident has the same and perhaps an even
greater need for assistance to meet living expenses as the individual that is injured in an accident.
Adopting Regal's arguments would be unjust, inequitable and would completely defeat the purposes
of Utah's no-fault statutes by placing additional burdens upon families of those killed in auto
accidents that do not exist to the same extent for those who are injured. For example, under Regal's
analysis a stay-at-home spouse of an individual killed in an automobile accident would have to
immediately begin performing ALL the household tasks previously performed by his or her spouse
as well as seek and obtain employment to provide for family living expenses without any assistance.
On the other hand, the individual who was injured rather than killed in an auto accident would
collect PIP benefits for his or her lost or decreased income and for the services performed during his
or her convalescence. In order to treat the families, individuals and insurers equally, and to further
the purposes of mandatory PEP benefits, PEP benefits for lost income and lost household services
should be paid in the event of death, disability or injury.
Regal, incorrectly asserts that the Botts claim that insurance coverage alone entitles them to
payment of PEP benefits. See Appellee's Brief at pp 9-10. The Botts, however, seek only a
declaration that PIP benefits for actual out-of-pocket expenses and actual lost income resulting from
a death be compensated in the same way as the actual out-of-pocket expenses and actual lost income
that result from injuries are compensated.
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Another "basic principle of the No-Fault Act is to prevent double recovery by the no-fault
insured." Dupuis v. Nielson, 624 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1981) (citing Street v. Farmers Ins.
Exchange, 609 P.2d 1343 (Utahl980); Allstate v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980); and Jones v.
Transamerica Ins. Co., 592 P.2d 609 (Utahl979). They should be interpreted to prevent insurance
companies from unfairly retaining profits at the expense of their insureds. Judgments on personal
injury cases should "only reflect damages suffered over and above those particular types of damages
reimbursed by the no-fault insurer." Id_ at 687. There is absolutely no risk of a double recovery or
windfall if the Botts are awarded PIP benefits in this case. There would, however, be a windfall to
Regal if the disputed PIP benefits are not awarded in this case. Insurers will unfairly benefit by a
windfall retention of monies if they are allowed to refuse benefits for lost wages and household
service expenses when an insured is killed that would have to be paid if the insured was only injured.
Such a result would frustrate, rather than promote, the purpose of Utah's no-fault laws.
It may be argued that decedents' families receive $4,500 in funeral and survivor benefits to
fulfill the purposes of the PIP statutes. Those amounts, however, are needed to address the
additional expenses associated with and arising from the death of a loved one. Furthermore, those
amounts are often offset by the insurer's ability, such as in this case, to escape the need to pay any
amount for medical expenses.
It could also be argued that there is no need to pay for basic living expenses if a wage-earning
child, rather than a wage earning parent is killed. The Legislature, however, did not see fit to limit
the recovery of the disputed PIP benefits to wage-earning heads-of- households. To the contrary,
the Utah Legislature mandated that "the lesser of $250 per week or 85% of ANY loss of gross
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income and loss of earning capacity per person from inability to work..." be paid. Utah Code Ann.
§ 31 A-22-307(l)(b)(i) (emphasis added). To recover PIP benefits for lost wages, the insured should
only have to demonstrate that income or earning capacity was lost as the result of an injury or death,
regardless of the status of the wage earner. Likewise, subpart (ii) of 31A-22-307(l)(b) requires
insurers to pay "$20 per day...for services actually rendered or expenses reasonably incurred for
services that, but for the injury, the injured person would have performed..." The only thing that
should be required to recover payment for lost household services is that services were rendered or
expenses incurred to perform services that would have been performed by the insured.
The wages lost and services performed are the same, regardless whether they result from an
injury or from a death. There is no logical justification to compensate the same losses differently,
depending on the cause of the loss. This is especially true when the purposes for PIP benefits govern
the outcome of that question. This Court should, therefore, determine that PIP benefits for lost
wages and household services be paid in the event of injury or death.
In deciding this case, the Court should keep in mind that Utah's insurance statutes were
passed to "ensure that policyholders, claimants, and insurers are treated fairly and equitably" Utah
Code Ann. § 31 A-1-102(2), and should be "liberally construed" to achieve fairness and equity, Utah
Code Ann. § 31 A-1-201. Fairness and equity for insurers and insureds demand that those suffering
actual lost wages and those requiring household services be reimbursed for those losses and expenses
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-307 whether they result from a death or from an injury. There
is no justifiable rationale to do otherwise. Regal and all other insurers should be required to pay
those losses pursuant to Utah's PIP statutes regardless of the reason for the losses.
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II.

THE BOTTS ARE ENTITLED TO RECEIVE PIP BENEFITS REQUIRED BY
UTAH CODE ANN. S 31A-22-307
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-308(3) allows "natural persons whose injuries arise out of an

automobile accident occurring while the person occupies the [insured] motor vehicle" to recover the
PIP benefits set forth in Section 307. In the instant case Jesse Bott was a natural person whose
injuries arose out of an automobile accident while he occupied the motor vehicle insured by Regal.
Regal asserts that because Jesse was killed, rather than injured, neither his estate, nor his heirs are
entitled to receive any PIP benefits, except funeral expenses or survivor's benefits. Such an argument
is offensive to fair play and justice and contrary to the purpose of the PIP statutes as described above.
Adopting Regal's argument would allow insurers to avoid payments to deceased insureds that they
would have to make to injured insureds. This would provide Regal and other insurers with a
windfall in the event of an insured's death that the insurer could not have realized in the event of an
insured's injury. Such an outcome would also create undue and unfair hardships for the families of
those killed in accidents. This is exactly the outcome the PIP statutes were enacted to avoid.
Additionally, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-703(3), a personal representative of a
decedent's estate "has [the same] standing to sue...as his decedent had immediately prior to his
death."(emphasis added) Therefore, Jesse's right, and the right of his estate to pursue these benefits,
do not end at the time of his death. The claims for PIP benefits should survive death as viable claims
of the deceased's estate. Also, Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-714(22) permits a personal representative to
"prosecute or defend claims or proceedings []for the protection of the estate..." Any claims that
Jesse could have brought pursuant to the PIP statutes if he had survived are properly pursued by his
estate and personal representatives.
-6-

Finally, the Utah Legislature saw fit to allow limits on the payment of PIP benefits only in
certain circumstances. Those limitations, which are the ONLY ALLOWABLE LIMITATIONS on
the payment of PEP benefits, are clearly set forth in Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309(2)(a), where it
states:
[a]ny insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage under this part may only
exclude from this coverage benefits:
(i) for any injury sustained by the insured while occupying another motor vehicle
owned by or furnished for the regular use of the insured or a resident family member
of the insured and not insured under the policy;
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person while operating the insured motor vehicle
without the express or implied consent of the insured or while not in lawful
possession of the insured motor vehicle;
(iii) to any injured person, if the personfs conduct contributed to his injury:
(a) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or
(b) while committing a felony;
(iv) for any injury sustained by any person arising out of the use of any motor vehicle
while located for use as a residence or premises;
(v) for any injury due to war, whether or not declared, civil war, insurrection,
rebellion or revolution, or to any act or condition incident to any of the foregoing;
or
(vi) for any injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous
properties of nuclear materials.
There is no indication whatsoever, in any of the allowable limitations that any required PEP benefits
could be denied if the individual entitled to those benefits died, either in, or after the accident. There
is likewise no indication whatsoever that an insurer may refuse to provide PIP benefits to the heirs
or the estate of an individual entitled to those benefits.
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The Utah Court of Appeals explicitly recognized that "an insurer may only exclude [PIP]
benefits for the specific reasons enumerated in the statute." Crowther v. Nationwide Mut. Ins, Co.,
762 P.2d 1119,1121 (Utah App. 1988). Furthermore, while the issues presented by this appeal have
never been directly addressed by the appellate courts of Utah, the decision in McCaffery v. Grow,
787 P.2d 901 (Utah App. 1990) implies that a decedent would be entitled to all the PIP benefits
required by statute, including lost wages and household services. Id. The claimant in McCaffery,
like Jesse Bott, died as the result of injuries sustained in an automobile accident. The Court of
Appeals ruled that McCaffery was not entitled to PIP benefits because he was not an insured, but
never even hinted that he would be precluded from recovering those benefits because of his death.
Because death is not one of the permissible exclusions for the payment of PIP benefits, Regal
and other insurers should be required to provide PIP benefits for lost wages and household services
to the estates of insureds, just as they do to injured insureds.
III.

JESSE BOTTfS DEATH RESULTED FROM THE INJURIES HE SUSTAINED IN
THE AUTO ACCIDENT AND RESULTED IN THE DISABILITY REFERRED TO
IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-307
Death and disability are not synonymous. The death of an individual from injuries sustained

in an automobile accident, however, unquestionably results in the inability to earn income which is
the focus of Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-307(l)(b)(i), which requires PEP benefits to be paid when an
insured has lost any income or earning capacity. Admittedly, no benefits for those losses need to be
paid for the first three days, if the insured's inability to work lasts for less than two consecutive
weeks. There is, however, no part of that code provision that authorizes an insurer to refuse to pay
benefits if the inability to work is permanent or results from a death. Even Regal's own definition
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of "work loss" indicates benefits will be paid for lost income and earning capacity "from inability
to work." [See Regal's definitions of work loss at R. p. 9] There is no indication that payments will
not be made if the "inability to work" results from death.
While the degree or length of a disability may provide fertile ground for disputes between
insureds and insurers, an insurer should not be permitted to escape payment for all lost wages simply
because the inability to work is permanent or the result of death. The Merriam Webster Dictionary
defines "disable" as: "to make unable to perform by or as if by illness, injury, or malfunction" and
defines "disabled" as "incapacitated by illness, injury, or wounds."

The Merriam Webster

Dictionary. Home and Office Edition, 1995.1 Jesse Bott is indisputably "unable to perform" and
"incapacitated" as the direct result of the "injuries" which took his life. That inability to earn an
income should require Regal to provide his estate and his heirs with the PEP benefits mandated by
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307. Applying Regal's tortured use of "disability" to preclude the
payment of lost income PIP benefits in the context of this case would defeat the purpose of the PIP
statutes and enrich insurance companies at the expense of their insureds.
IV.

THIS COURT CAN PROPERLY INTERPRET THE AMBIGUOUS PROVISIONS
IN REGAL'S POLICY TO PROVIDE THE BENEFITS REQUESTED IN THIS
DISPUTE
The ambiguous terms, provisions and portions of Regal's insurance policy at issue in this case

were placed before the trial court in Regal's Complaint [R. pp. 3-4,ffl[12, 13, 15 and 16)]; in the
Botts' Answer and Counterclaim [R. pp. 33-34, f 2)]; in Regal's Answer to the Counterclaim [R. p.

l

A copy of the page containing those definitions is included as Exhibit A to this Brief.
-9-

30,1ffi 6 and 9)]; and in Regal's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment [R. pp.
47-48 and 50-53].
Decisions interpreting contracts are questions of law and are subject to de novo review. State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. vDyer, 19 F.3d 514, 521 (10th Cir. 1994); Nielsen v. O'Reilly, 848 P.2d 664,
665 (Utah 1992); mdSimmons v. Farmers Ins. Group, 877 P.2d 1255,1257 (Utah App. 1994). The
record is complete. The facts are not disputed and the trial court's error needs to be corrected.
"Insurance policies should be construed liberally in favor of the insured and their beneficiaries"
USF&G vs. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 521-23 (Utah 1993). Ambiguities can arise because of vague or
ambiguous language or because two or more contract provisions, when read together, give rise to
different or inconsistent meanings..." USF&G, 854P.2dat523. SeealsoAlfv. State Farm Fire and
Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah 1993).
In the instant case, Regal's insurance policy promises to pay
personal injury protection benefits to or on behalf of each eligible injured person
for:
A.

medical expenses,

B.

work loss,

C.

funeral expenses, and

D.

survivor loss,

with respect to bodily injury sustained by an eligible injured person caused by an
accident involving the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle.
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[R. p. 8]. Regal then defines "bodily injury" as "bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death
resulting therefrom." (emphasis added). [R. p. 9 and Regal's Brief at pp. 6-7]? Therefore, Regal
promises to pay, medical expenses, work loss, funeral expenses and survivor loss in the event of a
death resulting from bodily injury caused by an accident involving the use of a motor vehicle.
Additionally, Regal defines "Work loss" as:
(1) loss of income and loss of earning capacity by the eligible injured person during
his lifetime, from inability to work...; and
(2) an allowance for services actually rendered or expenses reasonably incurred that,
but for the bodily injury, the eligible injured person would have performed during
his lifetime for his household....
[R. pp. 9-10]. Those policy provisions, especially when read in conjunction with Regal's promise
to pay PEP benefits for death, could both be read to provide benefits for income that would have
been earned during the insured's lifetime plus expenses for services that would have been rendered
during the insured's lifetime. Reading all the definitions together indicates that all the promised PIP
benefits should be paid whether the insured is injured or dies as a result of injuries caused by an auto
accident.
Jesse Bott was injured in an accident involving a motor vehicle and died as a result of those
injuries. He, his heirs and his estate, therefore, are entitled to receive PIP benefits promised by
Regal's policy for lost income and household expenses resulting from his injuries and death.

2

It is interesting and insightful to note that Regal uses two (2) different definitions of "bodily injury."
In the "DEFINITIONS USED THROUGHOUT THIS POLICY" section of Regal's Policy, "bodily injury"
"means bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death" while Regal's definition of "bodily injury"written
specifically to apply to PIP benefits includes death resulting from inj uries received in an automobile accident.
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CONCLUSION AND REQUESTED RELIEF
For the reasons set forth above the Botts ask this Court to reverse the trial court ruling and
remand this case for entry of a summaryjudgment in favor of the Botts, entitling them to recover the
PIP benefits for 52 weeks of Jesse?s wages, 365 days of replacement services rendered because of
his death, compound interest at VA % per month pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(5)(c)
and attorney's fees required by Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309(5)(d).

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Pursuant to Rule 29, Utah R. App. P. the Botts hereby re-request oral argument to address
any questions or concerns this Court may have as a result of the issues that arise from this Appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3

(lay of November, 2000.

SCALLEY & READING, P.C.
Attorneys for Appellants/the Botts

Li
Steven B. Smit

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on
day of November, 2000, -four true and correct copies of the
foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT were deposited in the U.S. Mail, first-class postage
prepaid, addressed to the following:
T.J. Tsakalos, # 3289
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
10 Exchange Place, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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KQALJ

Tab A

147

dip * disaster

AGER, SUPERVISOR, CONDUCTOR 2 : one of a group of
or out: LADLE 4 : to lower and then raise quickly ( ~
persons who direct the affairs
of an organized body
a flag in salute) 5 : to drop or slope down esp. sud— directorial Virek-atdr-e-3l\ adj — directordenly <the moon dipped below the crest) 6 : to deship
n
crease moderately and usu. temporarily (prices
dipped) 7 : to reach inside or as if inside or below a directorate Vta-retX n 1: the office or position of director 2 : a board of directors; also : membership on
surface (dipped into their savings) 8 : to delve casusuch a board 3 : an executive staff
ally into something; esp: to read superficially (~ into
a book)
dw-ectory \-t»-re\ n, pi -ries: an alphabetical or clas2
dip n 1 : an act of dipping; esp : a short swim 2 : insified list esp. of names and addresses
clination downward: DROP 3 : something obtained by direfula \adir-f3l\ adj : DREADFUL; also : OMINOUS
or used in dipping 4 : a sauce or soft mixture into dirge \ darj\ n : a song of lamentation; also : a slow
which food may be dipped 5 : a liquid into which
mournful piece of music
something may be dipped (as for cleansing or
dir*ham \adir-ham\ n\ — see MONEY table 2 — see dicoloring)
nar, riyal at
MONEY table
\adir-d-ja-bdl, da-ari-J3-\ n : AIRSHIP
diphtheria \dif-athir-e-o\ n : an acute contagious bac- di*ri*gM>le
a
terial disease marked by fever and by coating of the
dirk \ dark\
n : DAGGER 1
air passages with a membrane that interferes with
dirndl \ad3rnd-al\ n [short for G Dirndlkleid,fr.G dial.
breathing a
Dirndl girl + G Kleid dress]: a full skirt with a tight
waistband
diphthong \ dif-ithon\ n : two vowel sounds joined in
one syllable to form one speech sound (as ou in out) dirt \adart\ n 1: a filthy or soiling substance (as mud,
dust, or grime) 2: loose or packed earth: SOIL 3 : modiploid \*di-iploid\ adj : having the basic chromoral uncleanness 4 : scandalous gossip 5 : embarrasssome number doubled — diploid n
ing or incriminating information
d>plo*ma Xda-'plo-maX n, pi diplomas : an official record of graduationfromor of a degree conferred by 'dirty \adar-te\ adj dirt«i«er; -est 1 : SOILED, FILTHY 2
: INDECENT, SMUTTY (~ jokes) 3 : BASE, UNFAIR ( a ~
a school
trick) 4 : STORMY, FOGGY (~~ weather) 5 : not clear in
dH>lo*ma*cy Xda-'plo-ma-seX n 1: the art and practice
color
: DULL <a ~ red) — dirtiness n — dirty adv
of conducting
negotiations
between
nations
2
:
TACT
dip4o*mat\adi-pl3-imat\ n: one employed or skilled in 2dirty vb dirMed; dirtying : to make or become dirty
disable Xdi-'sa-balX vb disabled; disabling 1: to disdiplomacy — dip*lo*mat*ic \idi-pla-'ma-tik\ adj
qualify legally 2 : to make unable to perform by or as
di*plo*ma«tist
Vda-'pld-ma-tistV n : DIPLOMAT
if, by illness, injury, or malfunction — dis*abiM*ty
dip*per \adi-par\ n 1: any of a genus of birds that are
\idi-sd-abi-l»-te\ n
related to the thrushes and are skilled in diving 2
: something (as a ladle or scoop) that dips or is used disabled adj : incapacitated by illness, injury, or
for dipping 3 cap : BIG DIPPER 4 cap : LITTLE DIPPER
wounds; also : physically or mentally impaired
dip*so*maiiia \idip-s3-ama-ne-9\ n : an uncontrollable
dis*abuse\idi-S9-abyuz\ vb: to freefromerror, fallacy,
craving for alcoholic liquors — dip*so*ma«ni«ac Vneor misconception
•ak\/i
disadvantage \idi-sad-avan-tu\ n 1 : loss or damage
a
dip*stick \ dip-istik\ n : a graduated rod for indicating
esp. to reputation or finances 2 : an unfavorable, indepth
ferior, or prejudicial condition; also
: HANDICAP —
a
disadvantageous \di-isad-ivan-ata-jas, -van-\ adj
dip*ter*an \ dip-td-ran\ adj: of, relating to, or being a
fly (sense 2) — dipteran n — dip*ter*ous Vras\ adj disadvantaged \-tijd\ adj: lacking in basic resources
dir abbr
1 direction 2 director
or conditions believed necessary for an equal position in society
dire \adir\ adj diner; direst 1: very horrible: DREADFUL 2 : warning of disaster 3 : EXTREME
dis*af>fect\idi-s9-afekt\ vb: to alienate
the affection or
'direct \d»-arekt, dIA vb 1: ADDRESS ( ~ a letter); also
loyalty of— disaffection \-afek-slwn\ n
: to impart orally : AIM (~ a remark to the gallery) 2 disagree \idi-s»-agre\ vb 1: to fail to agree 2 : to differ
: to regulate the activities or course of: guide the suin opinion 3 : to cause discomfort or distress (fried
pervision, organizing, or performance of 3 : to cause
foods ~ with her) — disagreement n
to turn, move, or point or to follow a certain course
dis-agrecable \-3-bal\ adj 1: causing discomfort: UN4 : to point, extend, or project in a specified line or
PLEASANT, OFFENSIVE 2 : ILL-TEMPERED, PEEVISH —
course 5 : to request or instruct with authority 6 : to
disagree-ablcness
n — dis-agrecably \-ble\ adv
show or point out the way
disaHow \idi-sa-alau\ vb : to refuse to admit or rec2
direct adj 1: stemming immediatelyfroma source ( ~
ognize : REJECT (^/ a claim) — disallowance n
result) 2 : being or passing in a straight line of descent dis*ap*pear \idi-s9-*pir\ vb 1: to pass out of sight 2 : to
: LINEAL (r^ ancestor) 3 : leading from one point to
cease to be : become lost — dis*ap*pear*ance n
another in time or space without turn or stop
dis*ap*point Wi-sa-ap6int\ vb : to fail to fulfill the ex: STRAIGHT 4 : NATURAL, STRAIGHTFORWARD (a ***> pectation or hope of — dis*ap*point*ment n
manner) 5 : operating without an intervening agency
dirap*pro*ba*tion\di-isa-pr3-aba-sh9n\/i: DISAPPROVor step (*>" action) 6 : effected by the action of the AL
people or the electorate and not by representatives
disapproval \idi-S3-apru-V3l\ n : adverse judgment
: CENSURE
( ^ democracy) 7 : consisting of or reproducing the
disapprove \-apriiv\ vb 1: CONDEMN 2 : to feel or exexact words of a speaker or writer — direct adv —
press disapproval
(~*s of smoking) 3 : REJECT
direcMy adv — directness n
direct current n : an electric current flowing in one di- dis*arm \di-asarm\ vb 1 : to take arms or weapons
rection only
from 2 : to reduce the size and strength of the armed
direction Xd^rek-shan, df-\ n 1 : MANAGEMENT,
forces of a country 3 : to make harmless, peaceable,
GUIDANCE 2 : COMMAND, ORDER, INSTRUCTION 3 : the
or friendly
: win over (a ~ing smile) — disarmacourse or line along which something moves, lies, or
ment \-asar-m3-m3nt\
n
points 4 : TENDENCY, TREND — di*rection*al Vshadisarrange \idi-s9-aranj\ vb : to disturb the arrangenal\ adj
ment or order of — disarrangement n
directive \d»-arek-tiv, diA n : something that directs
disarray \-ara\ n 1 : DISORDER, CONFUSION 2 : disorand usu. impels toward an action or goal; esp: an orderly or careless dress
a
der issued by a high-level body or official
dis*as*sem*ble \idi-s9sem-bal\ vb : to take apart
direct mail n : printed matter used for soliciting busidis«as*so*ci*ate \-aso-she-iat, -seA vb : to detach from
ness or contributions and mailed direct to individuals
association director \d3-arek-tar, di-\/i 1: one that directs : MANdi*sas«ter \di-azas-tar, -asas-\ n [MF desastre,fr.It

